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1 - Key terms and definitions 
 
The intersection between justice and culture lies at the heart of many 
debates in criminal law.  
In primis, a clarification is required, as “culture” is a broad concept 
with several meanings. A legal definition that might be taken into account 
is the one given in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity of 2001: «[…] culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive 
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social 
group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, 
ways of living together, values systems, traditions and beliefs».1 
Keeping in mind this legal definition of culture, a culturally 
motivated crime consists in a conduct or act of a minority member, which 
is considered an offence by the majority group, but which is, nevertheless, 
approved or authorized by the minority because of its cultural 
significance.2 
                                                          
* Article peer evaluated. 
 
1 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 2001 (http://portal.unesco. 
org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html). 
For a detailed review on this topic, see F. BASILE, Immigrazione e reati culturalmente 
motivati. Il diritto penale nelle società multiculturali, Milano, 2010, p. 15 et seq. 
2 See J. VAN BROECK, Cultural Defence and Culturally Motivated Crimes (Cultural 
Offences), in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, IX, 2001, p. 5; A. 
BERNARDI, Il “fattore culturale” nel sistema penale, Giappichelli, Torino, 2010, p. 139 et seq. 
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In light of these definitions, scholars3 have labelled some sub-
categories of culturally motivated crimes, based on case-laws. Domestic 
violence, honour killings, child rights violations, sex crimes, female genital 
mutilations and male circumcisions, drug related crimes and crimes 
concerning ritual clothing are the main instances of cultural crimes that 
have occurred in recent years. 
Given these initial definitions, the main question addressed here is 




2 - Two ways to look at culturally motivated crimes: the case of the 
kirpan in the Italian and in the Canadian jurisprudence 
 
The Italian criminal law system has never taken into account the cultural 
factor as a general rule. 
The complex and tricky task of finding a legal framework for 
culturally motivated crimes is, therefore, left to the courts.  
In Italy, in one of the most known and debated decisions on 
culturally motivated crimes, the Court4 expressed a clear opinion on the 
intersection between culture and law.  
A faithful Sikh was convicted because he was carrying a so-called 
kirpan5, a small knife that the Court considered a weapon according to art. 
4, paragraph 2 of Law n. 110/1975. The defendant appealed to the Court 
of Cassation on grounds that the kirpan had to be considered a religious 
symbol protected by article 19 of the Italian Constitution. 
Nevertheless, the Italian Court of Cassation confirmed the 
judgment issued by the Court of Mantua and the man was convicted for 
the crime of carrying weapons. 
What is interesting for the purpose of this article is the reasoning of 
the Italian Court of Cassation. Referring to a former jurisprudential 
                                                          
3 See C. DE MAGLIE, I reati culturalmente motivati. Ideologie e modelli penali, ETS, Pisa, 
2010; A. BERNARDI, Il “fattore culturale”, cit.; F. BASILE, Immigrazione e reati, cit.; A. 
PROVERA, Tra frontiere e confini. Il diritto penale dell’età multiculturale, Napoli, 2018; G. 
CAVAGGION, Diritti culturali e modello costituzionale di integrazione, Giappichelli, Torino, 
2018. 
4 Court of Cassation, 31st March 2017, n. 24048. 
5 The defendant was stopped by the police carrying a knife of 18.5 cm length and he 
refused to surrender it to the police officer since it was a religious symbol. See Court of 
Cassation, 31st March 2017, n. 24048. 
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guideline6 7, the Court restated that freedom of religion may not justify the 
conduct. According to the Court, immigrants must comply with Western 
values and they are obligated to respect the cultural and legal context in 
which they live. 
The reasoning of the judgment has been criticized by several Italian 
scholars because the expression “Western values” is vague, misleading 
and without any specific legal meaning.8  
                                                          
6 See Court of Cassation, 14th July 2016, n. 24739; Court of Cassation, 16th July 2016, n. 
25163: according to the Court, the symbolic and religious meaning of the kirpan could not 
be considered a justifiable reason for wearing a weapon in public places according to 
article 4, paragraph 2 of Law n. 100/1975 and, therefore, the religious reason could not 
justify the conduct. 
The Italian Court of Cassation confirmes this former jurisprudential guideline in a 
very recent ruling, which also partially restates what affirmed by the Court in 2017. See 
Court of Cassation, 18th April 2019, n. 16917. 
7 For the sake of completeness and to briefly point out the jurisprudencial 
development, it is also worth referring to previous Italian case-law dealing with the 
kirpan issue: see Cremona Court of Law, n. 15, 19th February 2009; Piacenza Court of Law, 
24th November 2014; Modena Court of Law, 9th August 2003; Vicenza Court of Law, 28th 
January 2009 mentioned by G. CAVAGGION, Diritto alla libertà religiosa, pubblica 
sicurezza e “valori occidentali”. Le implicazioni della sentenza della Cassazione nel “caso kirpan” 
per il modello di integrazione italiano, in federalismi.it (online journal), n. 12, 2017, pp. 1-24, p. 
6. In all these sentences, judges stated that wearing the kirpan in public places could not 
be considered a crime, since this conduct has to be regarded as a justifiable reason 
connected to the constitutional right of religious freedom. On the other hand, banning the 
carrying of kirpan constitutes a violation of a constitutional right. From this brief analysis, 
it is clear that this former jurisprudencial guideline aimed at balancing religious freedom 
and security concerns, acknowledging prevalence to the first one. 
See A. LICASTRO, Il motivo religioso non giustifica il porto fuori dall’abitazione del kirpan 
da parte del fedele sikh (considerazioni in margine alle sentenze n. 24739 e n. 25163 del 2016 della 
Cassazione penale), in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, online journal 
(https://www.statoechiese.it), I, 2017, pp. 1-29; A. LICASTRO, La "sfida" del "kirpan"ai valori 
occidentali"nelle relazioni della dottrina alla pronunzia della Cassazione penale, Sez. I, 15 maggio 
2017, n.24084, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, 2016, pp. 371-383; G. GIORGIO, 
In tema di autorizzazione del porto in luogo pubblico di un coltello, c.d. "Kirpan", quale simbolo 
religioso, in Foro Italiano, n. 4, 2010, pp. 228-231; A. PROVERA, Il "giustificato motivo": la 
fede religiosa come limite intrinseco alla tipicità, in Rivista italiana di diritto processuale penale, 
n. 78, 2010, pp. 964-979; G.L. GATTA, Nota a Tribunale di Vicenza decr. 28 gennaio 2009, in 
Il corriere del merito, 2009; S. CARMIGNANI CARIDI, Ostentazione di simboli religiosi e 
porto di armi od oggetti atti ad offendere. Il problema del kirpan dei fedeli Sikh, in Diritto 
ecclesiastico, 2009, pp. 739-766.  
8 See F. BASILE, Ultimissime della giurisprudenza in materia di reati culturalmente 
motivati, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 2018/30, pp. 1-13; A. BERNARDI, 
Populismo giudiziario? L’evoluzione della giurisprudenza penale sul kirpan, in Rivista Italiana 
di Diritto e Procedura Penale, 2017, pp. 673-689; C.M. PETTINATO, La libertà dell’educazione 
religiosa davanti ai giudici canadesi (prendendo spunto dalla sentenza Loyola High School vs. 
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What is clear is that the Court of Cassation made a choice – a 
political choice9- in favor of security and safety to the detriment of 
religious freedom and pluralism.10 The Supreme Court restated the 
principle based on the idea that the “justifiable reason” shall be taken to 
occur when the conduct is lawful in accordance with the context and the 
ordinary use of the object: according to the Court reasoning, the kirpan is a 
knife considered a weapon ex article 4, paragraph 2 of Law n. 110/1975 
and, therefore, the wearing of the kirpan does not fall with the “justifiable 
reason” in defence of public security.11 
As pointed out by some scholars12, public security and safety are 
abstract concepts and they might easily undermine other constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                               
Québec), in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 2017/22, pp. 1-37; A. NEGRI, 
Religious freedom and inviolable lines in pluralistic societies: the case of cultural crimes, in Stato, 
Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 2019/30, pp. 175-189. 
9 A. BERNARDI, Populismo giudiziario?, cit., p. 684, qualifies the judgment as 
«ideologically influenced». 
10 The so called “right to security” is a debated issue: see Y.M. CITINO, Sicurezza e 
stato di diritto nella minaccia dei foreign terrorist fighters, in DirittiFondamentali.it (online 
journal), n. 2, 2019, pp. 1-44; T.E. FROSINI, Il diritto costituzionale alla sicurezza, in 
forumcostituionale.it (online journal), 2006; T.F. GIUPPONI, La sicurezza e le sue “dimensioni 
costituzionali”, in forumcostituzionale.it (online journal), 2008.  
Interesting to notice is that the prevalence granted to public safety also recurs in other 
judgments related to cultural and religious rights: see Milano Court of Law, 20th April 
2017 analysed by G. CAVAGGION, Diritto alla libertà religiosa, cit., p. 21-22. The author 
criticizes the judgement because no actual and concrete danger is linked to the cultural 
and religious conduct.  
On this same topic, see A. TORRE (edited by), Costituzioni e sicurezza dello Stato, 
Maggioli, Rimini, 2014; T.F. GIUPPONI, Sicurezza personale, sicurezza collettiva e misure di 
prevenzione. La tutela dei diritti fondamentali e l’attività di intelligence, in LORENZON S., 
VACCARI G., ZANETTI V. (edited by), Sicurezza collettiva e diritti fondamentali, Aracne, Roma, 
2008. 
11 As suggested by A. LICASTRO, Simboli religiosi e “valori occidentali”: diritto, religione, 
integrazione, in Ordines. Per un sapere unterdisciplinare sulle istituzioni europee, n. 1, 2019, pp. 
113-138, p. 123, the Court does not contextualize the conduct: the kirpan is used only as a 
simbolic and religiuos object, without any other purposes and, strictly speaking, the 
conduct should fall within the “justifiable reason”.  
12 See G. CAVAGGION, Diritto alla libertà religiosa, cit., p. 24; G. CASUSCELLI, Una 
disciplina-quadro delle libertà di religione: perchè, oggi più di prima, urge “provare e riprovare” a 
mettere al sicuro la pace religiosa, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 26, 2017, 
pp. 1-26; A. PACE, La sicurezza pubblica nella legalità costituzionale, in Rivista AIC, n. 1, 
2015, pp. 1-9; T.F. GIUPPONI, La sicurezza e le sue “dimensioni” costituzionali, in S. VIDA S. 
(a cura di), Diritti umani. Teorie, analisi, applicazioni, Bononia University Press, Bologna, 
2008, pp. 275-301. 
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rights, such as freedom of religion. The so called “right to security” should 
be linked with a concrete and material danger to restrict and limit 
religious freedom: it is questionable if the kirpan represents a concrete and 
effective danger to public safety13. 
It is inspiring to notice that other Western countries have found 
completely different solutions toward the kirpan issue. 
Generally speaking, the Western case-law approach toward the 
kirpan topic points out that the kirpan should not be considered as a 
weapon and, anyway, its religious and spiritual significance has to prevail 
over other constitutional values such as public safety14 15. 
A prime example may be found in Canada. The Supreme Court of 
Canada16 issued a similar legal case dealing with a Sikh carrying a kirpan 
to school, but the final judgment was completely opposite of the Italian 
one: the Multani case is an inspiring example of multiculturalism, cultural 
and legal tolerance in Canada. 
In Multani17 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Sikh students 
are entitled to wear their kirpan to school, since this conduct would not 
undermine school safety. In fact, there were no evidence that the kirpan 
had ever been used for violent purposes. 
The Canadian Supreme Court applied the principle of reasonable 
accommodation18 to sentence in accordance with multicultural values19.  
                                                          
13 See G. DE MINICO, Costituzione. Emergenza e terrorismo, Jovene, Napoli, 2016. 
14 It is inspiring to notice that in the Indian legal system the wearing of kirpan is 
protected as a constitutional right. See explanation I, article 25 of the Indian Constitution: 
«The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of 
the Sikh religion».  
See A. RINELLA, Famiglie, sistemi giuridici, fonti del diritto, in Diritto pubblico comparato, 
(edited by) G. MORBIDELLI, L. PEGORARO, A. RINELLA, M. VOLPI, Giappichelli, Torino, 2016. 
15 G. CAVAGGION, Diritto alla libertà religiosa, cit., pp. 4-5 provides a comparative 
case-law analysis of kirpan cases. A. NEGRI, Religious freedom and inviolable lines, cit., p. 
183 analyses the United Kingdom and the United States models both authorising Sikh to 
wear kirpan. 
16 Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256. 
17 Multani, cit., for the facts see https://www.cdn-hr-reporter.ca/hr_topics/religion-and-
creed/barring-kirpan-violates-freedom-religion. 
18 See A. EISENBERG, Rights in the Age of Identity Politics, in Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 
L, 2013, pp. 609-636, p. 621: «The requirement of reasonable accommodation entered 
Canadian law in the mid-1980s through human rights cases about religious 
discrimination in the workplace». See Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpson Sears, 
[1985] 2 SCR 536; Bhinder v CN, [1985] 2 SCR 561. 
19 See A. EISENBERG, Rights in the Age, cit., pp. 609-636. 
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The basic idea behind the Court reasoning was that when dealing 
with a minority culture or religion, judges have to consider and balance 
these differences to get an appropriate sentence for minorities. 20 
In other words, these rights have to be considered in order to 
acknowledge and respect minorities and to achieve a positive outcome in 
light of multiculturalism and legal pluralism.21 
Quoting the Court: «A total prohibition against wearing a kirpan to 
school undermines the value of this religious symbol and sends students 
the message that some religious practices do not merit the same protection 
as others. On the other hand, accommodating Gurbaj Singh and allowing 
him to wear his kirpan under certain conditions demonstrates the 
importance that our society attaches to protecting freedom of religion and 
to showing respect for its minorities».22 
 
 
3 - Moving forward: the Italian Court of Cassation n. 29613/2018 
 
The main questions arising from the former analysis are the following:  
how can a balance between criminal law and pluralism be achieved? Is 
there a method or a legal process applicable to such conflicts arising from 
the intersection of law and culture? 
The latest Italian Court of Cassation23 judgment on culturally 
motivated crimes comes in handy to partially answer these questions. 
Despite the 2017 ruling of the Italian Court of Cassation, the latest 
judgment of the Court on cultural crimes shows a more positive and open-
minded approach to the cultural topic: the Court develops a “cultural test” 
that may help judges in dealing with cultural issues on trial. 
Before analyzing the model developed by the Italian Court of 
Cassation, a brief excursus on cultural tests is essential. 
 
                                                          
20 See B. BERGER, The Cultural Limits of Legal Tolerance, in Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, XXI, 2008, pp. 245-277, p. 256: «In Multani, as well as the Same Sex Marriage 
Reference, the Court explained that the most appropriate means of dealing with such 
conflict is to balance religious freedom against these other rights and interests under the 
rubric of s. 1 of the Charter, which asks whether a limit on a right can be “demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society”». 
21 A. EISENBERG, Introduction: New Approaches to Freedom in Canada, in A. EISENBERG 
(edited by), Diversity and Equality. The Changing Framework of Freedom in Canada, UBC 
Press, Toronto, 2006, pp. 1-14, p. 7. 
22 Multani, cit., para. 79. 
23 Court of Cassation, 2nd July 2018, n. 29613. 
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3.1 - Cultural tests: a comparative insight 
 
Cultural tests are legal tools that were developed and introduced for the 
first time in Canada and in the United States during the ‘90s. 
The first cultural test was adopted in Canada by the Supreme Court 
in 1996 to treat Aboriginal claims. 24  
Dorothy Van der Peet member of the Sto:lo First Nation claimed her 
right to fish and trade salmon on the ground of her cultural background as 
protected by section 35 of Canada’s Constitution Act 1982.  
The Supreme Court of Canada developed a “distinctive culture 
test” to solve this case. The test is divided into ten questions25 that should 
help judges to fully understand and to better solve Aboriginal right 
claims. 
Even if this test has been criticized by Canadian doctrine and by 
Aboriginal communities because it does not answer Aboriginal claims in a 
                                                          
24 See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. See A. EISENBERG, Reasoning about 
Identity: Canada’s Distinctive Culture Test, in A. EISENBERG, Reasons of Identity. A Normative 
Guide to the Political & Legal Assessment of Identity Claims, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2009, pp.34-53. 
25 For the sake of completeness, the ten questions are the following:  
1. Courts must take into account the perspective of Aboriginal peoples themselves;  
2. Courts must identify precisely the nature of the claim being made in determining 
whether an Aboriginal claimant has demonstrated the existence of an Aboriginal right;  
3. In order to be integral a practice, custom or tradition must be of central 
significance to the Aboriginal society in question;  
4. The practices, customs and traditions which constitute Aboriginal rights are those 
which have continuity with the practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to 
contact;  
5. Courts must approach the rules of evidence in light of the evidentiary difficulties 
inherent in adjudicating Aboriginal claims;  
6. Claims to Aboriginal rights must be adjudicated on a specific rather than general 
basis;  
7. For a practice, custom or tradition to constitute an Aboriginal right it must be of 
independent significance to the Aboriginal culture in which it exists;  
8. The integral to a distinctive culture test requires that a practice, custom or 
tradition be distinctive; it does not require that that practice, custom or tradition be 
distinct;  
9. The influence of European culture will only be relevant to the inquiry if it is 
demonstrated that the practice, custom or tradition is only integral because of that 
influence;  
10. Courts must take into account both the relationship of Aboriginal peoples to the 
land and the distinctive societies and cultures of Aboriginal peoples. 
See R. v. Van der Peet, cit. 
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satisfactory way26, the idea behind the test deserves our attention: it is 
seen as a scientific and legal instrument to equally address cultural claims 
at trial. A logical path that guides judges in dealing with cultural issues is 
definitely a worthwhile starting point: «Although […] the test does not 
provide a satisfactory way of reasoning about identity, it does provide 
some insights into how a successful guide to the assessment of such claims 
might be developed».27 
American doctrine has likewise developed a cultural test in the ‘90s 
to better apply cultural defence during trials. One of the most complete 
and broad studies on this topic was suggested by Alison Dundes 
Renteln28. 
This test is based on three main questions:  
«1. Is the litigant a member of the ethic group?; 2. Does the group 
have such a tradition?; 3. Was the litigant influenced by the tradition when 
he or she acted?».29 
If all these questions have a positive answer, the judge might take 
into consideration the cultural background of the defendant, trying to 
balance it with the right offended by the conduct.  
An American case-law example in which the cultural test is used by 
a court is the Krasniqi case30: an Albanian father was prosecuted for child 
sexual abuse, but the defendant claimed that the conduct had a strong 
cultural meaning and no criminal intent. The Court stated that all the 
requirements set by the cultural test were met: « […] the father was 
Albanian, Albanians had a custom of touching children that was not 
erotic, and the father was motivated by the custom when he touched his 
daughter»31 and the man was therefore acquitted by the criminal law 
court. 
 
3.2 - The cultural test in the Italian judgment of 2018 
 
                                                          
26 See J. BORROWS, Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Trickster, in American Indian Law Review, XXII, 1997, pp. 37-64. 
27 See A. EISENBERG, Reasoning about Identity, cit., p. 35. 
28 See A.D. RENTELN, The Cultural Defence, 2004, New York; A.D. RENTELN, The Use 
and Abuse of the Cultural Defense, in Canadian Journal of Law and Society, XX, pp. 47-67, p. 49 
et seq. 
29 Ibidem. 
30 Krasniqui v. Dallas County Child Protective Services Unit of the Texas Department of 
Human Services, [1996] 809 S.W.2d 927. See A.D. RENTELN, The Use and Abuse, cit., p. 50. 
31 A.D. RENTELN, The Use and Abuse, cit., p. 51. 
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The facts behind the Court of Cassation judgment of 2018 are known32: an 
Albanian father was accused of child sexual abuse because he was seen 
touching, kissing and licking his son’s genitals. The defendant argued that 
the conduct was based on Albanian cultural heritage and is not considered 
a crime in his culture.  
The defendant was not found guilty either at first instance nor on 
appeal. The first instance Court stated that the conduct was not based on 
willful misconduct because it had a peculiar relevance in Albanian 
culture33.  
In the Court of Appeal reasoning, instead, the conduct did not 
consist of sexual acts.34 
Called upon to rule on this case, for the first time the Court of 
Cassation granted scientific relevance to culturally motivated crimes and 
acknowledged the importance of the intersection between criminal law 
and culture in today’s society; it moreover dealt with these crimes with a 
systematic approach.  
Last but not least, what was really remarkable in the ruling is the 
cultural test proposed by the Court35. It involves three key steps to reach a 
fitting sentence by taking into account the cultural factor.36 
First of all, judges have to balance and compare the cultural and 
religious right with the one offended by the cultural or religious conduct. 
It is also relevant to explore the degree of the offence.  On this point, the 
Court restated that there are some limits to legal tolerance that cannot be 
overcome and exceeded in any criminal system: cultural and religious 
tolerance must not undermine fundamental human rights. 
                                                          
32 See F. BASILE, Quanto conta la “cultura? La Cassazione torna sui reati cd. Culturalmente 
motivati, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2018, pp. 2244-2251. 
33 See I. RUGGIU, Omnia munda mundis. La pratica culturale dell’„omaggio al pene” del 
bambino: uno studio per la cultural defense, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 
27/2019, pp. 1-29, for a complete analysis of the cultural practice. 
34 See. A. PROVERA, Carezze o violenze? La Cassazione affronta il problema dei reati 
sessuali a presunto orientamento culturale, in Diritto penale e processo, XI, 2018, pp. 1432-1438, 
p. 1436 et seq. 
35 The Italian doctrine had already suggested a cultural test to be adopted in 
courtrooms. See I. RUGGIU, Il giudice antropologo, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2012; I. 
RUGGIU Il giudice antropologo e il test culturale, in Questione Giustizia (online journal), I, 
2017, pp. 226-232 for a more articulated test. The Court of Cassation endorses the test 
suggested by F. BASILE, I reati cd. «culturalmente motivati» commessi dagli immigrati: 
(possibili) soluzioni giurisprudenziali, in Questione Giustizia, I, 2017, pp. 126-135. 
36 See F. BASILE, Quanto conta la “cultura”, cit., pp. 2244-2251; F. BASILE, Ultimissime 
della giurisprudenza, cit., p. 11; A. PROVERA, Carezze o violenze, cit., pp. 1432-1438; I. 
RUGGIU, Omnia munda mundis., cit., pp. 1-29. 
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Secondly, judges have to explore the nature of the cultural or 
religious practice and its obligatoriness in the minority group.  
Lastly, it is important to assess the standard of integration into the 
dominant culture: the more the offender is integrated in mainstream 
culture, the less a cultural defence has effect.  
At the very end of its reasoning, the Court briefly analyzed 
evidentiary aspects based on cultural factors and difficulties proving 
existence of a specific cultural practice.37 
Even so, in the decision to set aside and refer back, the Court of 
Cassation argued that in the case at trial: first of all, cultural defence was 
bounded by human rights that should not be violated because of  cultural 
belief; secondly, sex organs kissing harmed the sexual freedom of the 
child,  regardless father’s intention; lastly, the defendant did not provide 
proper evidence on the cultural practice in Albanian community. In light 
of those reasons, the Court dismissed the cultural defence claim. 
On May 16th, 2019, the Bologna Court of Appeal - in reasoning the 
case - issued a new sentence: the defendant was convicted for sexual 
offences against children to 2 years and 8 months in prison and 
compensation for damages ex art. 609 quarter of the Italian Criminal Code. 
It is worth mentioning that the defendant’s family and the Albanian 




4 - Final remarks 
 
What clearly emerges from the comparative approach39 is that it is 
necessary to find a balance between the demands of the majority and the 
minority group: how this cultural and religious mediation can be achieved 
represents the focal point of the present article.   
The Italian legal system has to be ready to deal with different 
culture and this requires flexibility and capacity to adapt. As shown by the 
Canadian legal model, it is necessary to meet halfway according to the 
supreme principle of laicità defined in its democratic and positive 
                                                          
37 See B. PASTORE, Multiculturalismo e processo penale, in Cassazione penale, IX, 2006, 
pp. 3030-3046; A. BIGIARINI, La prova culturale nel processo penale, in Cassazione penale, I, 
2018, pp. 411-420. 
38 I. RUGGIU, Omnia munda mundis, cit., p. 18. 
39 See M.A. FODDAI (a cura di), Il Canada come laboratorio giuridico. Spunti di riflessione 
per l’Italia, Jovene, Napoli, 2013. 
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meaning. Laicità stands for impartiality, knowledge of the other and 
dialogue40. As stated by the Italian Constitutional Court41, laicità « does not 
imply indifference to religion but the State guarantee for the protection of 
freedom of religion, under the religious and cultural pluralism».42 
In light of that, the main and key focus should be discerned in the 
values of human dignity and individual’s identity as guiding principles to 
develop the best possible solutions to fit the needs of a laico-pluralistic 
State43: these values might represent the insurmountable ethical 
minimum44 that can not be ignored by judges to avoid «old errors of 
anthropologists (from) becoming new errors of judges».45 
In particular with regard to criminal law – keeping in mind these 
general principles acquired through the comparative approach-, the 
challenging goal is how a «legal-institutional mechanism of 
multiculturalism»46 through which the cultural factor acquires a full legal 
relevance in criminal law might be developed. 
The latest Italian Court of Cassation seems to head in this direction, 
as also suggested by scholars: both Court and doctrine grasp the urgent 
need to develop a legal method - such as the cultural test - to solve these 
conflicts, likewise to when done by common law countries. 
Having said that, it has to be acknowledged that when culturally 
motivated crimes undermine fundamental human rights that must be 
protected in any cultural context:  
« […] courts might still wish to reject the cultural defense. Where 
cultural traditions involve irreparable harm to individuals belonging to 
                                                          
40 See C.M. PETTINATO, La libertà dell’educazione religiosa, cit., p 36, and J. 
PASQUALI CERIOLI, La laicità nella giurisprudenza amministrativa: da principio supremo a 
"simbolo religioso", in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., March 2009, pp. 1-24. 
41 Constitutional Court, n. 203/1989. 
42 Constitutional Court, n. 203/1989. 
43 See A. EISENBERG, Rights in the Age, cit., p. 616; N. COLAIANNI, Eguaglianza e 
diversità culturali e religiose. Un percorso costituzionale, il Mulino, Bologna, 2006, p. 50; N. 
COLAIANNI, La lotta per la laicità. Stato e Chiesa nell’età dei diritti, Cacucci, Bari, 2017, p. 
58. 
44 J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, Propaganda religiosa: la libertà silente, Giappichelli, Torino, 
2018, p. 162 
45 I. RUGGIU, Test e argomenti culturali nella giurisprudenza italiana e comparata, in 
Quaderni costituzionali, 2011, pp. 531-549, p. 532. 
46 A. SHACHAR, Multicultural Jurisdictions. Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 1. G. DI COSIMO, Giudici e politica alle 
prese con i conflitti multiculturali, in Rivista AIC, n. 4, 2019, pp.133-134, draws up an 
overview of different cultural and religious conflict resolution models besed on both 
legislative and jurisprudential approaches.  
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vulnerable groups, the defense should not influence the disposition of 
cases»47.  
Besides a cultural test that helps criminal judges in establishing 
whether the cultural background has influenced the conduct, are there any 
other legal instruments that should be applied to culturally motivated 
crimes when the cultural belief cannot be accommodated in the legal 
system, but at the same time has a strong relevance in the offender’s 
conduct?  
This is still an open question48 that needs to be further investigated 
to embrace multiculturalism as a guiding policy and to promote a 
constructive relationship between criminal law and culture aimed to 
create «a site of meaningful pluralism»49 in the criminal system. 
 
 
                                                          
47 A.D. RENTELN, The Use and Abuse, cit., p. 50. 
48 One possible answer can be found in the Restorative justice model: it could be 
complementary to the criminal process and might be experimentally applied to cultural 
crimes. Once the offender has fulfilled the restorative program, a specific mitigating 
circumstance based on cultural factor might be applied. That requires a deep rethinking 
and reflection on the legal experience on the whole, as suggested by L. PICOTTI, La 
mediazione nel sistema penale minorile: spunti per una sintesi, in L. PICOTTI (edited by), La 
mediazione nel sistema penale minorile, Cedam, Padova, 1998., pp. 283-312, p. 285. See A. 
PROVERA, Tra frontiere e confini, cit., p. 315; M. DONINI, Il diritto riparato. Una 
disequazione che può trasformare il sistema sanzionatorio, in Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, II, 
2015, pp. 236-250; B. SRICIGO, La giustizia riparativa nel sistema penale e penitenziario in 
Nuova Zelanda e in Australia: ipotesi di complementarietà, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto e 
Procedura Penale, 2015, pp. 1923-1942. 
49 M. BRIGG, Rebalancing Power and Culture? The Case of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
in R. PROVOST (edited by), Culture in the Domains of Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2017, pp. 247-265, p. 249. 
